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I. Introduction
Morality is demanding; this is a platitude. It is thus no surprise when we ﬁ nd 
that moral theories too, when we look into what they require, turn out to be 
demanding. However, there is one leading moral theory—consequentialism—
which is confronted to by a demandingness problem. The demands the theory 
makes on us are so great (or so the argument runs) that consequentialism 
must be rejected. It simply requires too much of us.
This objection gives rise to a number of pressing questions. Is it right to 
claim that consequentialism makes excessive demands? Is there a limit on 
how demanding morality can be? Why single out consequentialism? Is it the 
only moral theory that makes unacceptably high demands? If the demand-
ingness problem is real, what is the consequentialist’s best response? This 
chapter sets out to answer these questions (or at least point to how they could 
be answered).
The chapter has the following structure. I will ﬁ rst present the objection 
(section II), then explain how it diﬀ ers from other objections (section III) and 
why it targets consequentialism in particular (section IV). We will see that it is 
not at all easy to explain why the trouble with consequentialism is on account 
of its demandingness only. Aft er this, I will present the objection in a more 
formal way that helps me to introduce the diﬀ erent ways of responding to 
it (section V). In the remainder of the chapter, I will discuss three (relatively) 
underexplored responses: (1) a response that introduces a new, multidimen-
sional version of consequentialism (section VI); (2) a response that focuses on 
the role of institutions in lowering demands on individuals by introducing an 
institutional division of labor (section VII); and (3) response that changes the 
focus to reasons and their connection to consequentialist demands (section 
VIII). I then end with a brief summary and make some concluding remarks 
(section IX).
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II. Consequentialism and Demandingness
Start with the targeted theory.1 Consequentialism, in its most general sense, is 
the view that normative properties depend only on consequences. This general 
approach can be applied at diﬀ erent levels to diﬀ erent normative properties 
of diﬀ erent kinds of things, but the most prominent example is consequen-
tialism about the moral rightness of acts. This (moral) consequentialism holds 
that whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that 
act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a 
general rule requiring acts of the same kind, as judged from an impersonal 
perspective.
The paradigm case of moral consequentialism is utilitarianism, whose clas-
sic proponents were Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick. 
These classical utilitarians were all act-consequentialist: They held that whether 
an act is morally right or wrong depends only on its consequences (as opposed 
to the circumstances or the intrinsic nature of the act or anything that hap-
pens before the act or anything that relates to the act). They were utilitarians 
because they advocated consequentialism with a welfarist theory of value, 
that is, a theory that focuses on human welfare, well-being, or happiness as 
the relevant consequence. And since they understood happiness in terms of 
the balance of the amount of pleasure over pain, they were also hedonists. The 
demandingness objection has originally targeted these classical utilitarians, 
but can be employed against any form of act-consequentialism.2
What exactly does the objection say? Discussions of the objection normally 
begin with short stories like the following two:3
The Envelope. On your desk is an envelope addressed to a reputable 
charity seeking donations to save the lives of victims of a famine or other 
natural disaster. Utilitarianism says you should give all your money to this 
charity, as each dollar will produce more happiness in their hands than 
you could possibly produce by spending it in any other way.
Your Money and Charity. You are wondering whether to spend a pound 
on chocolate for yourself or to give it to a certain charity. You know that 
this charity is unusually eﬀ ective and that even a small contribution can 
help them save a child from some crippling and painful illness. Since you 
obviously do more good by saving a child from illness than by eating 
a piece of chocolate, you ought to give the pound to charity. However, 
if you repeat this utilitarian reasoning every time you have a pound to 
spare, you will end up very poor indeed.
The ﬁ rst story, The Envelope, gives us the traditional version of the objection 
with one large consequentialist demand countering whatever else the agent 
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might be planning to do. The second story, Your Money and Charity, is designed 
to show how small but iterated demands can add up to altogether excessive 
demands.4 In either the case, the message is the same: the demands of conse-
quentialism are excessive and, therefore, objectionable.5
Let us now have a closer look at the structure of the objection. It is built upon 
two pillars: (1), that consequentialism is excessively demanding, and (2) that an 
adequate morality cannot be excessively demanding. Consequentialism requires 
the agent to promote the good (consequences) until the point where further 
eﬀ orts would burden the agent as much as they would beneﬁ t others. However, 
the situation that determines what would be best overall is far from ideal: today’s 
world involves, for example, signiﬁ cant levels of poverty that prevailing levels 
of charitable donations are insuﬃ  cient to eradicate.6 Given that acting to allevi-
ate poverty is likely to have, in sum, more positive consequences than pursuing 
individual goals and projects, it seems unavoidable that, if one fully accepts con-
sequentialism, one must devote most of one’s resources to humanitarian work. 
Both The Envelope and Your Money and Charity make the same point in their own, 
more particular way. At the same time, so the objection assumes, most people 
have a ﬁ rmly held judgment that this cannot be right, that people should not be 
required to sacriﬁ ce their lives for morality. This is the second pillar of the objec-
tion. Its function is to ground a constraint on admissible moral theories requiring 
them to avoid excessive demands. If they do not, the conclusion follows that 
these theories should not be allowed to guide people’s conduct.
III. Demandingness and Other Objections
The demandingness objection makes a simple case against consequentialism: 
Since the consequentialist agent is required to maximize the overall balance 
of good consequences, this is excessively demanding (in our present circum-
stances), hence objectionable (because one should be given the opportunity to 
have a life outside morality). To get a clearer grasp of the objection, it is useful 
to contrast it with other objections to consequentialism that are oft en bundled 
together with it. This will ultimately also contribute to our understanding of 
why consequentialism is singled out by the objection as its sole target.
Here is a famous case from Bernard Williams (1973a: 98–9):
Jim and the Indians. “Jim ﬁ nds himself in the central square of a small 
South American town. Tied up against the wall are a row of twenty 
Indians, most terriﬁ ed, a few deﬁ ant, in front of them several armed men 
in uniform. A heavy man in a sweat-stained khaki shirt turns out to be 
the captain in charge and, aft er a good deal of questioning of Jim which 
establishes that he got there by accident while on a botanical expedition, 
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explains that the Indians are a random group of the inhabitants who, 
aft er recent acts of protest against the government, are just about to 
be killed to remind other possible protestors of the advantages of not 
protesting. However, since Jim is an honoured visitor from another land, 
the captain is happy to oﬀ er him a guest’s privilege of killing one of the 
Indians himself. If Jim accepts, then as a special mark of the occasion, 
the other Indians will be let oﬀ . Of course, if Jim refuses, then there is no 
special occasion, and Pedro here will do what he was about to do when 
Jim arrived, and kill them all. Jim, with some desperate recollection of 
schoolboy ﬁ ction, wonders whether if he got hold of a gun, he could hold 
the captain, Pedro and the rest of the soldiers to threat, but it is quite clear 
from the set-up that nothing of that kind is going to work: any att empt 
at that sort of thing will mean that all the Indians will be killed, and 
himself. The men against the wall, and the other villagers, understand the 
situation, and are obviously begging him to accept. What should he do?”
In sum, Jim gets to choose between two actions: (i) not killing anyone himself, 
yet thereby causing the death of twenty villagers. Or (ii) killing one of the vil-
lagers himself, thereby ensuring that the others go free. Williams argues that a 
utilitarian cannot avoid that conclusion that (i) is the morally required course 
of action: Jim should kill one villager.
However, this conclusion can be found troubling for three reasons; Williams 
himself mentions two. One, the utilitarian reasoning makes it clear that it does 
not matt er how certain consequences are produced: Whether Jim kills one vil-
lager, or Pedro, as a result of Jim’s refusal, kills all twenty, matt ers only to the 
extent that in the latt er case the consequences are worse. Utilitarianism is insen-
sitive to the distinction between doing and allowing, which in this particular 
case translates into the distinction between killing someone and allowing them 
to die (by failing to prevent Pedro’s act). The result is what Williams (1973a: 
95) calls negative responsibility: “that if I am ever responsible for anything, then I 
must be just as responsible for things that I allow or fail to prevent, as I am for 
things that I myself, in the more everyday restricted sense, bring about.”
However, Williams argues that the fact that utilitarians cannot escape 
endorsing negative responsibility is a ﬂ aw of the utilitarian theory. According 
to Williams, it matt ers morally whether you cause an outcome actively (i.e., 
by producing a certain course of actions) or passively (by refraining to act in 
a  certain way and thus allowing it to happen). It also matt ers if the chain of 
causal events that produces an outcome contains someone else’s act and deci-
sion or not, that is, if an outcome includes someone else’s doing or solely my 
own doing. In short, “each of us is specially responsible for what he does, rather 
than for what other people do” (ibid.: 99). Utilitarianism does not respect this 
important moral insight and therefore it cannot be the correct moral theory.
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So this is one problem with consequentialism. But Williams does not stop 
here. He argues that endorsing negative responsibility leads to alienation from 
one’s own life projects and, ultimately, to the disintegration of the self (ibid.: 
116–17):7
The point is that [the agent] is identiﬁ ed with his actions as ﬂ owing from 
projects or att itudes which . . . he takes seriously at the deepest level, as 
what his life is about . . . It is absurd to demand of such a man, when the 
sums come in from the utility network which the projects of others have 
in part determined, that he should just step aside from his own project 
and decision and acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation 
requires. It is to alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the 
source of his action in his own convictions. It is to make him into a 
channel between the input of everyone’s projects, including his own, and 
an output of optimiﬁ c decision; but this is to neglect the extent to which 
his actions and his decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions 
which ﬂ ow from the projects and att itudes with which he is most closely 
identiﬁ ed. It is thus, in the most literal sense, an att ack on his integrity.
Negative responsibility arises from consequentialism’s commitment that only 
consequences matt er, not how and by whom they are produced: what count 
are the (valuable) states of aﬀ airs produced and nothing else. But this means 
that a utilitarian who is committ ed to thinking in this way is also committ ed 
to look at his or her own projects in the same way: not as in any particular 
sense his or her own, but as only one among many others that matt er only to the 
extent that when satisﬁ ed, pursued, accomplished, and so on, they produce 
valuable states of aﬀ airs. However, Williams (ibid.: 116) argues, this is not 
how we relate to the projects we identify with and committ ed to. He famously 
asks: “[H]ow can a man, as a utilitarian agent, come to regard as one satisfac-
tion among others, and a dispensable one, a project or att itude round which 
he has built his life, just because someone else’s projects have so structured the 
causal scene that this is how the utilitarian sum comes out?”
Take Jim and the Indians. Jim is a harmless academic who does not want to 
kill: this, we can assume, is a central commitment in his life. He lives and sees 
this project, as it were, from the inside—from a ﬁ rst-person, partial point of 
view. However, utilitarianism is another project and maybe it is even another 
project of his: it is, moreover, a higher-order project that feeds on these lower-
order projects since it is the satisfaction of these projects that produces the 
relevant valuable consequences. Now, this higher-order project requires Jim to 
look at his lower-order project of not killing, as it were, from the outside—from 
a third-person, impartial point of view.8 And from this viewpoint, his project 
loses all its peculiar, personal meaning and becomes only one  project among 
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many other projects of many other people. It is just another project with a 
label on it—“permitt ed” or “not permitt ed”—and nothing more, depending 
on how “the utilitarian sum comes out.” But this is a project that, at least in 
part, deﬁ nes Jim as he is; it is not merely a labeled item for him.9 Hence util-
itarianism, when it requires him to forget all about this, also alienates him 
from these projects and destroys the unity and shape of the particular life—his 
life—that is built around them; in short, it destroys his integrity.10
What underlies the ﬁ rst two problems with consequentialism is the same 
feature of the theory: its exclusive reliance on consequences. It is only these 
valuable states of aﬀ airs that matt er, not how and by whom they are pro-
duced: if the right sum comes out, nothing else matt ers. In particular, there 
is no place for respecting particular persons’ particular projects or welfare: 
people appear to be mere carriers of the good, elements in the causal chain 
who are needed only to produce valuable consequences. This leads the theory 
not to respect basic moral distinctions (how consequences are produced and 
who causes them) and to produce alienation and loss of integrity (given how 
people relate to their commitments and projects they identify with). However, 
as John Rawls (1971: 26–7) has famously argued, this feature also causes con-
sequentialism to fail at the most basic metaphysical level, because it does not 
take seriously the separateness of persons:
The striking feature of the utilitarian view of justice is that it does not 
matt er, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfaction is distributed among 
individuals any more than it matt ers, except indirectly, how one man 
distributes his satisfaction over time. The correct distribution in either 
case is that which yields the maximum fulﬁ llment . . . Utilitarianism does 
not take seriously the distinction between persons.
The three objections paint a clear alternative picture to consequentialism. 
Each of us has a particular, separate life to live, a life that has a particular 
shape and unity, as deﬁ ned by the projects and commitments we have, around 
which our lives are organized. Hence, it matt ers that we do something or 
someone else does or that it was our project that was thrown out in order to 
produce the best overall consequences.
However, while this is true, it is also clear that these objections to conse-
quentialism are diﬀ erent from the demandingness objection. First, they tar-
get diﬀ erent things. They are not designed to question the excessive demands 
of consequentialism, but to object to its picture of the self (both metaphysical 
and motivational) and its disrespect for certain important moral distinctions. 
Second, the three alternative objections do not necessarily connect to excessive 
demands. This is clearly so with the integrity objection: any theory, whether 
demanding or not, violates agential integrity if it does not respect the way 
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agents relate to their projects and commitments. As for the other two objec-
tions, they play a part in creating excessive demands, but they certainly are 
not the only ingredients: maximization (of valuable consequences) is another 
and the particular theory of value employed (whether it concerns human or 
sentient welfare, for instance) is a third, and there can be others. Finally, third, 
one can defend the distinction between doing and allowing, argue against 
the separateness of persons, and ﬁ nd a way around the integrity objection, 
without doing anything about the demandingness of consequentialism.11
IV. Why (Only) Consequentialism?
Yet, it might be the case that the three objections are vital for understanding 
why the demandingness objection is typically considered as exclusively target-
ing consequentialism. Recall our original question: why is only consequential-
ism targeted in this way? It seems that other moral theories are comparably 
demanding. Take two popular alternatives to consequentialism. Deontology, 
typically associated with the name of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, 
holds that there are certain things that simply cannot be done to people: these 
considerations, oft en called “rights,” function as absolute prohibitions on our 
actions. Another popular theory, virtue ethics, argues that the right thing to do 
is what the virtuous person would do, that is, the person who possesses certain 
character traits and dispositions (“virtues” such as honesty, courage, justice, and 
so on) to the maximum degree. However, as is oft en pointed out, Kantian prohi-
bitions on deception can be excessively demanding in certain situations when, 
for instance, the only way to save lives is by lying about the whereabouts of peo-
ple; emulating ideally virtuous characters (think of Mother Theresa, Gandhi, or 
Jesus) is arguably excessively demanding, yet, this is what virtue theory asks us 
to do. And these are only two examples of a non-consequentialist moral theory 
requiring us to give up our personal plans, projects, commitments for morality’s 
sake. So why is only consequentialism singled out as objectionably demanding? 
Now, one thing that could be said in response is that the three alternative objec-
tions point to those aspects of consequentialism that explain why its demand-
ingness is objectionable: because it does not respect the separateness of persons, 
or because it does not respect agential integrity, or because it does not respect 
the distinction between doing and allowing (cf. Mulgan 2001: 15–18).
My problem with this suggestion is that it seems to go against the self-stand-
ing status of the demandingness objection. If the only problem with the demand-
ingness of consequentialism, that is, the aspect that distinguishes its demands 
from the similarly excessive demands of other moral theories, is that it runs 
into one of the objections above, then it is these aspects—no respect for integ-
rity, no respect for separateness, no respect for certain moral distinctions—and 
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not the demands per se that are objectionable. In other words, the reason why 
we reject consequentialism is not its excessive demandingness but something 
else that these demands only track, connected to, or derived from.
There is a clear parallel here with two inﬂ uential responses to the demand-
ingness objection. David Sobel (2007) has argued that there is a way to support 
the objection, but this support presupposes “prior and independent breaks 
with consequentialism,” that is, prior to and independent of issues of demand-
ingness. This break concerns the distinction between the costs a moral theory 
requires the agent to bear and the costs a moral theory permits to befall on 
other people as a result of not requiring agents to prevent something happen-
ing to these people.12 The demandingness objection, he argues, only focuses 
on costs a moral theory requires to bear, and totally disregards the costs a 
moral theory permits; this is why it says that consequentialism is objectionably 
demanding. However, this distinction and the resulting choice presupposes 
that we already know something about “the true shape of  morality” before we 
employ the objection. That is, when we are concerned with the objection what 
we are concerned with is not excessive demands, but something else that our 
complaints only track, namely the distinction between the two kinds of costs.
Liam Murphy (2000) bases his cooperative consequentialism on an analo-
gous diagnosis of the demandingness objection. Unlike Sobel, his focus is not 
on certain moral distinctions but on the fairness of moral demands. His claim 
is that the problem with consequentialism is not that it demands too much, but 
that its demands are unfair. Consequentialism is insensitive to the contribu-
tions of others, hence it requires one to contribute more if the others contribute 
less. In other words, it requires the agent to pick up the slack that is produced 
by the non-compliance of others. This indeed makes the demands of conse-
quentialism excessive but this is not why we object to them: we object to them 
because they are unfair. So again, although there is an issue with the excessive 
demands of consequentialism, their excessiveness is not what the issue is; it at 
best tracks or connected to the real problem: namely, their unfairness.
It is not my aim in this chapter to evaluate these varying analyses and the 
responses they give rise to, but to point out that, as Murphy nicely puts it, they 
do not solve the demandingness objection but dissolve it: understood along 
these lines—be that integrity, separateness, fairness, or else—the demand-
ingness objection ceases to be an objection to consequentialism on account 
of its demandingness. What else can we say to explain why consequential-
ism is objectionable solely on account of its demandingness and other, simi-
larly demanding moral theories are not? I see three strategies. One is to refuse 
to answer the question. We can accept that consequentialism is not alone in 
being excessively demanding and hold that either all theories that make high 
demands are objectionable, or none are.13 The trouble with this way of reason-
ing is that it is widely accepted that there is something about consequentialism 
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that makes it objectionably demanding that is not present in other, similarly 
demanding moral theories. The best would be to respect this common intui-
tion instead of disregarding it.14
So let us look for alternative explanations. One is oﬀ ered by the notion of 
supererogation. The idea is that consequentialism, unlike non-consequentialist 
theories, has no place for acts that go beyond the call of duty: acts that are mor-
ally admirable, hence morally permitt ed, but not demanded, that is, morally 
required. Non-consequentialists can accept the existence of such actions since 
they do not require the agent to do what is best impersonally. Kantian deon-
tology, for instance, can hold that within the bounds of certain prohibitions, 
actions that produce the best consequences are permitt ed but not required. 
This is why consequentialism is objectionably demanding while other the-
ories are not: it does not leave room for these supererogatory options. The 
trouble with this explanation is that many question the coherence of super-
erogation. It appears to be paradoxical if one, reasonably, assumes that one 
has more moral reason to do what is bett er overall. Since this is the case with 
supererogatory acts, then the question arises: how can one be morally permit-
ted to do something when one has more moral reason to do something else? 
There may be answers to this question, but it is also important, in the present 
context anyway, that the resolution of the paradox is such that it keeps the 
demandingness problematic in place.
Assuming the paradox can be resolved in the “proper” way, supererogation 
could oﬀ er us a way to explain the special demandingness of consequential-
ism.15 A second explanation comes from Doug Portmore (2011: 4). He focuses 
on what I would call consequentialism’s sensitivity to incremental changes 
in demands. He makes the point like this: “Utilitarianism implies that agents 
should sacriﬁ ce, not only their disposable income, but even their own lives and 
the lives of those whom they love most whenever doing so will produce the 
most aggregate utility, and, thus, even when the net gain would be as small as 
one utile” (ibid., referring to Hooker 2000: 151–2). On this explanation then, the 
reason why we ﬁ nd consequentialism objectionably demanding but other sim-
ilarly demanding moral theories not, is that, unlike those other theories, conse-
quentialism gives rise to high demands while being too sensitive to incremental 
changes in the overall balance of good consequences. This may well appear to 
be objectionably demanding, as Portmore’s quoted example illustrates.
V. Two Readings and Responses to One
The overall message of the preceding discussion is that it is not easy to ﬁ nd 
an explanation of the demandingness objection that keeps its self-standing 
status as well as the form in which it is normally oﬀ ered: as an objection to 
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consequentialism and consequentialism alone. Yet, as I tried to demonstrate 
in the previous section, there are ways of explaining why consequentialism is 
the exclusive target of the objection. From this point on, therefore, I assume 
that the objection is in good shape. How can one respond to it? In this short 
section, I would like to go through the main responsive strategies (although 
not all of them, as I explain below). To do this, the best is to start afresh; having 
reached half way in the chapter, this is a good idea anyway. Take the objection 
again. What does it say?
We should separate two readings of the objection. They are distinguished 
by how one spells out the idea that excessive consequentialist demands are 
objectionable (Portmore 2011: 26 referring to Dorsey 2012). Consequentialism 
can be understood as wrongfully demanding if it requires agents to make sac-
riﬁ ces that they are not, in fact, morally required to make. Alternatively, conse-
quentialism can be understood as unreasonably demanding if it requires agents 
to make sacriﬁ ces that they do not have decisive reason to make.16 In this and 
the coming two sections I focus on the ﬁ rst reading, which has a more inﬂ u-
ential historical pedigree.
For a (new) start then, let us pull the threads together. The demandingness 
objection starts from the excessive nature of consequentialist demands. It 
claims that these demands, therefore, are objectionable. We now know what 
this stands for: consequentialist demands are objectionable because they are 
not demands that we are in fact morally required to make. In short, conse-
quentialism is wrongfully demanding. There is still the question why this is 
so, given that other moral theories make similarly excessive demands with 
a similarly detrimental eﬀ ect on our personal, non-moral lives. Why is con-
sequentialism the only target of the objection? This is a diﬃ  cult question to 
answer but in the previous section I provided two—admitt edly, provisional—
answers: excessive consequentialist demands do not leave room for super-
erogatory actions, or, they are absurdly insensitive to incremental changes in 
the overall balance of valuable consequences. This is what makes them not 
only excessive, but objectionable, in the moral sense outlined here.
So this is where we stand. How can we respond to the objection understood 
in this way? We can put the objection somewhat more formally as making the 
following argument:
(1) Consequentialism makes demand D;
(2) Demand D is not a wrongful demand;
Therefore,
(3) Consequentialism is wrongfully demanding;
(4) If a moral theory is wrongfully demanding, then we have reason to 
reject it;
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Therefore,
(5) We have reason to reject consequentialism.
This more detailed structure gives us guidance in devising the most eﬀ ective 
response strategy. Of these, the following two responses ﬁ gure most frequently 
in the literature.17 The strategy of denial rejects premise (1) either because it holds 
that the premise rests on false empirical facts or because it aims to restructure 
consequentialism in such a way that it no longer makes the demand.18 Taking 
an entirely diﬀ erent stance, the strategy of extremism does not deny that conse-
quentialism makes high demands; what it denies is that these high demands 
are objectionable because not right: that is, it rejects  premise (2).19 It does this by 
undermining or discrediting the intuition that the premise uses as support. Thus, 
it is argued that this intuition rests on lack of information, lack of clear thinking, 
lack of imaginative empathy or on some psychological “failure,” or that it tracks 
something entirely diﬀ erent from issues of excessive demands, or that its (typi-
cally, evolutionary) origins are such that we have no reason to take it seriously.20
Much has been writt en about these att empts but in this chapter I will not 
aim to rehearse the points already made about well-known approaches. 
Instead, in the following two sections, I will focus on two ideas that have been 
left  relatively unexplored by others. They can both be categorized as versions 
of the strategy of denial. I am not convinced about the success of either and 
will therefore approach them with caution: I will try to sketch how the answer 
to the demandingness objection would go and make some critical points along 
the way. First I will discuss a new version of consequentialism, called multidi-
mensional consequentialism that was recently developed by Martin Peterson. 
Then I will move on to the role institutions may play in reducing the demands 
of consequentialism on individuals. In the last substantial section of this chap-
ter I will turn to the second reading of the objection mentioned above in order 
to sketch possible responses and their potential problems.
VI. Multidimensional Consequentialism and Demandingness
In his recent book, Martin Peterson (2013) puts forward a new version of con-
sequentialism that he dubs “Multidimensional Consequentialism” (MDC).21 
Peterson claims that his theory is in signiﬁ cant respects superior to other con-
sequentialist theories: it is intuitively more appealing and it manages to avoid 
many of the inﬂ uential objections to consequentialism, among them our par-
ticular interest, the demandingness objection.
The best place to start our investigation is Peterson’s deﬁ nitions of MDC (3f.):
Let the set of C*-aspects be the set of all properties that can aﬀ ect an act’s 
deontic status according to consequentialist theories, e.g., the wellbeing 
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produced by the act, or its degree of equality, and so on. The key 
distinction researched in this book can then be stated as follows:
One-dimensional consequentialism =def the view that an act’s deontic status 
can be characterised by a one-place function of some C*-aspect.
Multidimensional consequentialism =def the view that an act’s deontic status 
can only be characterised by a function of several C*-aspects.
Several elements of these deﬁ nitions require explanation and/or further elab-
oration. First, in line with how I understand the theory, consequentialism on 
Peterson’s reading is the view that “the deontic status of an act depends only 
on consequences” (1). Peterson dubs this principle C*. Moral aspects are those 
properties that directly inﬂ uence the deontic status of an act, where “ inﬂ uence” 
is understood in terms of functions: “An aspect, a, directly  inﬂ uences the 
deontic status, d, of an act if and only if d is a function of a” (3).22 Putt ing these 
three—principle C*, moral aspects, inﬂ uence as function—together, we get 
Peterson’s deﬁ nitions above.23
Second, moral aspects are not the same as moral dimensions. “A dimension,” 
Peterson explains, “can be conceived of as the conceptual space in which an 
aspect can be altered” (4).24 This also means, as Peterson subsequently admits, 
that a consequentialist theory that identiﬁ es several moral aspects as aﬀ ecting 
the deontic status of an act need not be properly speaking multidimensional 
because all these aspects might belong to the same dimension. However, for 
reasons of convenience and because his particular version will identify moral 
aspects that belong to diﬀ erent dimensions, Peterson keeps the label “multidi-
mensional’ throughout the book and I follow him on this.
Finally, third, moral aspects that determine deontic status must be irreduc-
ible. This is in fact the deﬁ ning thesis of MDC and follows from the deﬁ nition 
given above. Peterson labels the thesis C1. One-dimensional consequentialists 
must reject C1; multidimensional consequentialists must endorse it. However, 
Peterson goes on to claim that “in order to formulate a normatively plausible 
multidimensional theory, which ﬁ ts well with our considered intuitions, two 
further non-deﬁ nitional claims need to be added. Both these claims raise sub-
stantial moral issues and are logically independent of C1” (8).
The ﬁ rst additional claim is C2: “The binary relation ‘at least as good conse-
quences as’ is not a complete ordering” (8). The idea behind this thesis is that 
diﬀ erent moral aspects are either incomparable or on a par—“that it is impos-
sible to establish a precise exchange rate between all relevant aspects”25 (9). 
The last deﬁ ning thesis of Peterson’s version of MDC is given by C3: “Moral 
rightness and wrongness are non-binary entities, meaning that moral right-
ness and wrongness vary in degrees” (9). Peterson’s idea is simple: not all acts 
are either entirely right or wrong; some acts fall within this spectrum being 
in part right and in part wrong. To sum up, Peterson cashes out the deontic 
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status—the all-things-considered moral rightness or wrongness—of an act as 
a function of separate, irreducible, and incomparable (on a par) moral aspects 
(dimensions). He explicitly mentions three such aspects—well-being (per-
sons), equality, and risk—but this is not intended as a comprehensive list.
There is, of course, a lot to say about the plausibility of Peterson’s theory 
but this is beyond the scope of this chapter.26 We should instead concentrate 
on how MDC responds to the demandingness objection. Peterson claims that 
MDC has the resources to defuse the objection because it can hold that donat-
ing is both right and wrong at the same time (47–8). The idea, as Peterson 
explains (70), is that those who donate excessively damage their own as well 
as their loved ones’ well-being. That this is so is hard to doubt: the demand-
ingness objection builds just on this observation (recall my introduction in sec-
tion II). Since, according to Peterson, persons’ well-being count separately, this 
inﬂ uences the calculation of all-things-considered rightness by making exces-
sive donation less right and more wrong. Why does each person’s well-being 
count separately? Because, as I indicated above, “person” is a separate moral 
aspect in MDC: Unlike customary consequentialist calculations that, as we 
saw, do not take account of whose well-being is aﬀ ected, MDC considers each 
person’s well-being separately, as playing a separate part in determining the 
deontic status of an act. This helps the theory to avoid the separateness of per-
sons objection as well as, or so Peterson claims, the demandingness objection.
I ﬁ nd this new take on consequentialism intriguing and its response to 
the demandingness objection appealing. Yet, I would like to raise one crit-
ical point that oﬀ ers at least something to ponder upon for an advocate of 
MDC. Start with the following general problem. One purpose of (deontic) all-
things-considered judgments—judgments one arrives at aft er having taken 
into consideration everything that pertains to the rightness or wrongness 
of the given action—is the provision of action-guidance. However, all-things-
considered judgments are not action-guiding in a satisfactory way if they 
do not single out at least one action as the thing to do—and this is exactly 
what MDC doesn’t do. (Imagine the following conversation: “What ought I to 
do?”—“Well, there is nothing it would be entirely right for you to do. To some 
extent . . .”—“What?!”) This seems to spell trouble for the theory.
Now, Peterson could reply that on his theory the thing to do is the action 
that is most right in the given circumstances.27 However, if the thing to do on 
MDC is the act that is most right in the given situation, it is far from clear that 
Peterson can indeed disarm the demandingness objection. For, if the thing to 
do is the act with the highest deontic score (“most right”), it is well possible 
that, given the world as it is, consequentialism will still come out as exces-
sively demanding. In other words, it is not enough if Peterson can show that 
excessive donation on MDC is not entirely right; he must also show that the 
ranking of alternative acts is such that excessive donation does not come out 
on top.28 Although this is no knockdown objection to MDC, it shows that lots 
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of details must be ﬁ lled in before we get a truly convincing response to the 
demandingness objection. MDC doesn’t, in other words, just by construction, 
accomplish this.
Peterson could try to get around this problem by holding that the thing to 
do is not what is most right to do in the given situation but what is suﬃ  ciently 
right to do. However, besides the fact that this raises the question of where we 
draw the line (what is suﬃ  ciently right?), we also end up with the mirror of the 
debate about satisﬁ cing consequentialism (and/or suﬃ  cientarianism in theo-
ries of distributive justice).29 Another possible way-out for Peterson would be 
to adopt agent-relative theories of value—or maybe a person-relative dimen-
sion of value. Again, however, this would leave us with the mirror version of 
an ongoing debate.30 In general, arguments based on satisﬁ cing, agent-relative 
value, and so on, would be disappointing in the present context, for the hope 
was for MDC to escape the demandingness objection in virtue of multidimen-
sionality and not in some other way.
VII. Institutions and Demands
The core idea of this response, well known from the literature on John Rawls’ 
theory of justice, is to direct att ention to the ability of institutions to reduce 
moral demands on individuals. This is possible because a division of labor is 
justiﬁ able: the demanding moral principles regulate institutions, whereas 
individuals “only” have the duty to set up and maintain these institutions. 
However, in order to get oﬀ  the ground, this “institutional approach” has 
to tackle two basic challenges. First, Liam Murphy (1998) has argued that 
demandingness considerations will not give us what he calls dualism: the 
idea that diﬀ erent principles apply to institutions and to individuals. And, 
the thought is, we need dualism to substantiate the present response to the 
demandingness objection. Second, consequentialism, unlike, for instance, the 
Rawlsian system, appears to be a monist theory in Murphy’s sense: the same 
principle (of beneﬁ cence) applies to individuals as to institutions. Hence the 
dualist idea that is taken to underlie the present response to the objection may 
not be justiﬁ able in the case of consequentialism, whether or not the demand-
ingness objection can lead us to dualism.
I believe that both objections can be answered. There is, ﬁ rst, the ques-
tion whether we indeed need to appeal to dualism in order to respond to the 
demandingness objection. As Murphy’s own discussion demonstrates (ibid.: 
262–3), this need not be so: a monist theory can accommodate division of labor 
between institutions and individuals without making use of dualism itself. 
This is because it simply makes good sense, from within the monist theory, to 
leave the thrust of the burden of justice (Murphy’s primary interest) to institu-
tions allowing people to live their lives. Second, one can keep dualism as the 
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answer to the demandingness objection without going along with the stronger 
idea that it is the objection itself that necessitates our endorsement of dualism. 
Rawls and others provide good reasons in favor of dualism—I mention some 
of these below—that are not discussed by Murphy. Once these reasons are on 
the table, one can hold that we should endorse dualism for these reasons and 
this will still give us a response to the objection as a (perhaps unintended) side 
eﬀ ect of the division of labor that dualism secures for us.
There is, moreover, and despite Murphy’s point above, good reason to 
endorse dualism and not simply to rely on monism’s ability to accommodate 
the idea of division of labor. In the (Rawlsian sense) non-ideal circumstances 
we live in, a monist theory poses too much risk for those who want to tackle the 
demandingness objection.31 For it is likely to be the case that in many circum-
stances, think of global challenges for instance, we cannot rely on institutions 
to do the bulk of the work for us (either because they do not exist or because 
they are not eﬃ  cient enough). In such cases monism requires individual con-
tribution that might well turn out to be excessively demanding. This, however, 
makes the second problem above even more pressing. Rawls and others fol-
lowing him use consequentialism as the prime example of a comprehensive, 
monist theory: the principle of beneﬁ cence should apply both to institutional 
and to individual conduct. How can we deny this? The answer is that we do 
not have to deny it insofar as it is properly understood. Let me explain.
The key move here is to introduce a distinction discussed at length by 
Samuel Scheﬄ  er (2005, 2006). There are two versions of the idea of division of 
labor in Rawls’s work. There is, ﬁ rst, a division of moral labor that urges us to 
have separate moral principles for institutions and individuals on the ground 
that they promote diﬀ erent moral values. Since the relevant moral values in 
the case of individuals also have to do with partial concerns—such as special 
relationships or self-interest—this is indeed a form of division of labor that 
consequentialism cannot make use of; on this reading consequentialism must 
be a monist theory.
The institutional division of labor, on the other hand, relies on the idea 
that there are two kinds of social rules—one for the design of the basic insti-
tutional structure of society and the other for individual conduct. Principles 
of justice belong to the ﬁ rst kind for several reasons, most prominent among 
them is the consideration that in maintaining what Rawls calls background 
justice, epistemological challenges arise that cannot be faced by individuals 
on their own. It simply takes a lot to ﬁ gure out in a complex system like a 
state-governed society what exactly a moral principle, even if it is simple, 
requires: no individual is capable of gathering the relevant data and carry 
out the necessary computations and reasoning. Another good reason for the 
institutional division of labor is the constitutive role institutions play in deter-
mining the demands of justice (Miklósi 2008 and Miklós 2013). To mention 
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one consideration, fundamental moral principles underdetermine moral 
requirements; hence, it is not possible to understand what a moral principle 
demands prior to the operation of institutions. One way this can happen is 
that moral principles, although give us a set of options to choose from, cannot 
make the choice themselves: they do not single out a unique set of distribu-
tive shares, or rights, or obligations. Institutions, such as the legal system, can 
however do just this—and until this is done, it is not determined what exactly 
is the right thing to do.
It seems to me that both considerations can also be applied to the case of con-
sequentialism. Application of the theory clearly faces serious epistemological 
challenges, nor is the theory diﬀ erent from its main competitors concerning the 
indeterminacy of its requirements. If this is so, it seems we have found a way 
for marrying consequentialism and dualism. Moreover, if this claim is sound, 
it should also suﬃ  ce to answer Murphy’s inﬂ uential objection to dualism: that 
it is perverse to require people to establish and maintain just (in this case: con-
sequentialist) institutions, but not require them to personally pursue the aim of 
justice (when this is the most eﬃ  cient way to proceed). For, there are good rea-
sons to single out institutions as morally special (in fact, there are more good 
reasons than what I have—very brieﬂ y—presented above) that make a per-
fectly good case for why individuals shouldn’t—because, as far as the reasons 
above are concerned, couldn’t—pursue the aim of justice individually.32
Having taken (very provisional) care of these initial problems, we can move 
on to consider the institutional response to the demandingness objection on its 
(substantial) merits. There are several issues that need to be discussed (includ-
ing empirical questions concerning the exact demandingness of the institu-
tional approach) but here I only focus on one that I ﬁ nd particularly interesting: 
global justice. Arguably, the demandingness objection is most persuasive when 
we appeal to existing global problems (what justice, peace, or the environment 
would require on the global scale). However, it might seem that the institu-
tional approach is in trouble here since the relevant institutions, but not the 
demands are missing; hence, dualism cannot be appealed to in response to the 
objection in this case.33 One reply to this objection is to endorse what is oft en 
called the relationalist position in the literature on global justice: that claims of 
justice are grounded in certain institutional relations among people, such as, to 
mention another inﬂ uential Rawlsian thought, the mutually beneﬁ cial cooper-
ative relations people oft en maintain. Hence the response: since these relations 
do not exist globally, there are also no global moral demands. However, I am 
not personally inclined to endorse this way of thinking about global justice; 
besides, and this is more important in the present context, consequentialism is 
the prime example of a non-relationalist theory, that is, one that does not ground 
claims of justice in institutional relations among people.34 Consequentialists 
seem to be committ ed to the thought that we have moral duties in virtue of our 
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common humanity, for example, the fact, that we all can feel pain and pleasure, 
or be well-oﬀ  or badly oﬀ  in some other way.
With the relationist approach out of the way, we need to ﬁ nd the institu-
tions that can be used as instruments to carry out (and in part constitute) what 
consequentialism requires on the global level. Without this we cannot make 
our dualist approach work in practice. Can we ﬁ nd the relevant institutions? 
There are two ways to proceed. One is to point to already existing institutions 
on the global level; this is what relationalist advocates of global justice do and 
we can borrow from them at this point.35 Here one can cite such examples 
as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), or the World Bank but there is a lot of empirical research done in this 
ﬁ eld that we cannot do justice here.36 The point is that there are already sev-
eral institutions that can be used for the purposes of fulﬁ lling consequentialist 
requirements. Naturally, a lot more can be done to improve these institutions 
and it is a largely empirical matt er how this will look like and what it will 
require (and how demanding this will be).
Another way to go about responding is to make a radical break with what 
we can consider to be the status quo: why not build a global state instead of 
relying on already existing but rather constrained institutions? This is what 
Torbjörn Tännsjö (2008) suggests that we should do. He argues that the three 
major global problems—lack of world peace, environmental problems, and 
problems of justice—can only be tackled by a world state. Moreover, he adds, 
we have a unique window of opportunity to build such a state: the fact that 
we have only one superpower in existence, namely, the United States. Tännsjö 
then goes on to master empirical as well as theoretical support for these claims, 
arguments that I cannot do justice here. However, the message is clear. Global 
moral demands are real and cannot be evaded. Moreover, we either already 
have the means for tackling them, or we can develop these means—if needed, 
in the form of a world state.
To sum up, the institutional approach to the demandingness objection is a 
promising but certainly insuﬃ  ciently worked out way to respond to the chal-
lenge. The problems are both theoretical and empirical in nature, as I have 
att empted to demonstrate above; yet, I believe it is worth the eﬀ ort to work out 
this approach in detail to see where it takes us and what we can achieve with it.
VIII. Consequentialist Reasons and Demandingness
We are nearing the end of a long journey. There is one response left  to dis-
cuss but to do this, I need to return to the second reading of the objection in 
 section V and say a bit more about how it unfolds. Recall, on the second read-
ing the objection claims that consequentialism is unreasonably demanding: it 
9781441126283_Ch29_Final_txt_print.indd   516 4/16/2015   10:42:56 AM
Moral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of Consequentialism
517
requires us to do things that we do not have decisive reason to do. We can 
formalize the argument in the following way:
(1) Consequentialism makes demand D;
(2) Demand D is unreasonable;
Therefore,
(3) Consequentialism is unreasonably demanding;
(4) If a moral theory is unreasonably demanding, then we have reason to 
reject it;
Therefore,
(5) We have reason to reject consequentialism.
Unlike the analogous reasoning of the ﬁ rst reading, this argument requires 
further elaboration. Premise (2) is again supported by an intuition that we 
supposedly share. It is that consequentialist reasons are not the only reasons 
around and at least some of the alternative reasons are stronger than conse-
quentialist reasons. Portmore (2011: 32) identiﬁ es two such classes of reasons:
(1) reasons that have nothing to do with promoting the good, such as the 
reason one has to refrain from violating someone’s autonomy even when 
doing so is a means to promoting the good, and (2) reasons that stem from 
the special relations that we bear to ourselves and our loved ones, such as 
the reason one has to promote the good by saving one’s own loved one as 
opposed to by helping some stranger save her loved one.
Some of these reasons are moral (those rooted in our respect for others’ 
 autonomy or those grounded in special obligations), others are non-moral 
(those grounded in our self-interest), but their common feature is that 
 consequentialism, as understood here, cannot accommodate them: they have 
nothing to do with the maximization of impersonal goodness.
The other critical point of the argument is premise (4). Unlike the analo-
gous premise of the ﬁ rst reading, the truth of this premise is not obvious. It 
is based on the thesis that what morality requires us to do must also be ratio-
nally authoritative: it must be backed by decisive reasons. Moral rationalism, as 
Portmore (ibid.: 28) calls the thesis, brings together the moral and the rational 
and has many supporters. They understand moral rationalism as a constraint 
on moral theories: if a moral theory turns out to make demands on us that 
we are not rationally required to fulﬁ ll, it is not a defensible moral theory. 
Consequentialism is a case at hand due to the existence of (sometimes) stron-
ger non-consequentialist reasons.37
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Notice, moreover, that this account of why we should reject consequen-
tialism could give us a third explanation why the theory is the sole target 
of the demandingness objection: unlike other moral theories, consequential-
ism does not respect the existence of non-consequentialist reasons. This is 
up for discussion, though (do other moral theories indeed respect all these 
reasons?); but even if this claim turns out to be not the case, the present 
story can well supplement the two explanations mentioned in section IV. 
Portmore (ibid.: 4) is clear about this. Consequentialism’s sensitivity to incre-
mental changes makes it particularly liable to encounter situations in which 
non-consequentialist reasons come out as winners: it is hard to accept that 
a tiny litt le improvement in the overall goodness of consequences would be 
enough to rationally justify acting against (some perhaps quite powerful) 
non- consequentialist reasons.
Let us return to the argument. Counteratt acks can be launched at three 
points.38 Premise (1) can again be rejected. This is typically argued by showing 
that consequentialism can accommodate the kinds of reasons mentioned by 
Portmore. These att empts have received suﬃ  cient att ention in the literature 
and I will not discuss them here.39 Next, one can reject premise (2). This can 
again be done in extremist fashion as in the case of the ﬁ rst reading of the objec-
tion. Alternatively, one can carry out empirical research to see if the premise 
is indeed intuitively supported: if it is indeed part of commonsense morality 
that these reasons exist and are (sometimes) stronger than consequentialist 
reasons. However, although I am supportive of such investigations, I certainly 
would not consider their results decisive.40
A third line of response rejects premise (4) by giving up moral rationalism. 
On the face of it, the att empt is doomed to failure because it marginalizes 
morality. This is how Hurley (2009: 60) puts the problem:
If we accept that morality, properly understood, provides merely one 
among other sets of standards, and that this set of standards lacks 
the distinctive relationship that has been claimed for it to our reasons 
for acting, then morality is shift ed toward the margins of meaningful 
inquiry into what rational agents such as ourselves have reasons to do. 
This would be a pyrrhic victory for the consequentialist, vindicating 
his account of moral standards only by marginalizing the role of such 
standards in practical reason and deliberation.
I have two problems with Hurley’s marginalization charge. One, it is not obvi-
ously counterintuitive to hold that consequentialist reasons do not always 
outweigh our non-consequentialist reasons. Portmore’s point about the exis-
tence and strength of these alternative reasons suggests this much. So it is far 
from clear to me why, contra Hurley, consequentialists shouldn’t embrace the 
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denial of moral rationalism: consequentialist morality is oft en a marginal aﬀ air 
from a rational viewpoint, why should we deny this? Second, consequential-
ism, as usually conceived, is a theory of moral standards and not a theory of 
moral reasons: it is a thesis on what is the right or wrong thing to do, not a 
claim about what we have reason to do. Hence, we have to augment conse-
quentialism with a suitable theory of practical reasons and then see if this is 
in line with moral rationalism. However, this is clearly an open-ended project 
that shouldn’t be prematurely given up just because one insists on the truth of 
moral rationalism.41
So far we have operated with a picture of morality and rationality that takes 
them to be separate realms. One has a theory of moral standards and one has 
a theory of reasons and then combines them in some way to see if we get to 
moral rationalism. This way of proceeding seems to equate moral rationalism 
with what is oft en called the overridingness thesis: the claim that moral reasons 
and requirements override non-moral reasons and requirements (Scheﬄ  er 
1992: 52; Stroud 1998: 171). That the two doctrines amount to the same thing 
is suggested by the following line of reasoning. Let’s ﬁ rst suppose that rea-
sons determine what we are morally required to do. Reasons are not added 
to or derived from an already existing moral picture, but they are the primary 
determinants of moral requirements. Let’s further suppose that in determin-
ing what we are morally required to do, moral reasons play a decisive role: 
they are the only reasons that count in determining our moral requirements. 
Finally, let’s suppose moral rationalism is true, and hence that what morality 
requires us to do must also be rationally authoritative. The end result is the 
overridingness thesis: moral reasons and requirements will invariably out-
weigh all non-moral reasons and requirements.
But, as Portmore (2011: 38–40) points out, it is a mistake simply to equate 
moral rationalism with the overridingness thesis. In fact, disambiguating 
these theses is crucial because it shows us that there is another way for con-
sequentialists to avoid the demandingness objection. Portmore embraces this 
opportunity. He argues that, contrary to the second claim above, moral as well 
as non-moral reasons determine what we are morally required to do. Why is 
this crucial? Because it makes the following strategy possible (ibid.: 41–2):
So although some may be compelled to accept moral rationalism because 
they think that moral requirements generate overriding reasons to abide 
by them, others, like myself, may be driven to accept moral rationalism 
because they think that morality is limited in what it can require of 
us—that morality can require us to do only that which we have decisive 
reason to do, all things considered. The thought would be that although 
moral requirements do not generate overriding reasons to abide by 
them, moral rationalism is, nevertheless, true, for non-moral reasons 
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serve to constrain what morality can require of us in that they sometimes 
successfully counter our moral reasons, preventing them from generating 
moral requirements.
Schematically, then, Portmore argues like this. One, reasons determine moral 
requirements; two, these reasons are moral and non-moral, consequentialist 
as well as non-consequentialist; three, the morality so produced is nonetheless 
a consequentialist morality. This reasoning indeed preserves moral rational-
ism since, as Portmore above explains, nothing will be allowed to come out as 
a moral requirement that doesn’t have the support of reasons.
Of course, the reasoning is eminently questionable.42 I already mentioned 
that step one oﬀ ers only one picture of morality and rationality and I added 
that Portmore argues for step two. It is an even less straightforward matt er, 
and takes Portmore the rest of his book to argue for, that the resulting morality 
will be consequentialist.43 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Portmore’s 
consequentialism is not the consequentialism of this chapter. He takes con-
sequentialism of that kind to be defeated by the demandingness objection. 
In other words, what Portmore does is to restructure consequentialism and 
thereby deny premise (1) of the demandingness objection. Hence, even if his 
argument succeeds, there will still be the question whether his consequential-
ism is indeed one we want to accept. Needless to say, just as with the other 
two responses, there is no space here to take up any of these matt ers. I believe 
Portmore’s theory is promising and deserves detailed discussion, but this can-
not be conducted in this chapter.44
IX. Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I set out to do three things. (1) I wanted to clarify what the 
demandingness objection is about. (2) I wanted to explain why the objection 
targets only consequentialism. (3) I wanted to present responses that are (rel-
atively) underexplored in the literature. I hope to have accomplished the ﬁ rst 
two tasks and at least partially carried out the third. I do not claim to have 
not left  questions open; in fact, at least in the case of potential responses, my 
intention was to raise questions. To answer those questions, however, is a task 
left  for another occasion.
Notes
1 Those who want to read about consequentialism in more detail can turn to Sinnott -
Armstrong (2014). Mulgan (2007) and Bykvist (2010) also provide very good intro-
ductory discussions and of course most introductory ethics texts will have a detailed 
discussion of the theory.
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2 Henceforth: “consequentialism,” unless qualiﬁ er needed. In the rest of this chapter 
I will use the terms “consequentialism” and “utilitarianism” synonymously: the 
objections to utilitarianism that I will consider are also objections to consequential-
ism and vice versa.
3 The ﬁ rst comes from Mulgan (2007), page 95, the second from Bykvist (2010), 
page 98.
4 See Cullity (2004) and (2009) for introducing and making substantial use of these 
iterated demands.
5 Precision at this point would require clariﬁ cation of the notion of “demand,” but I 
cannot do this in the present chapter. I wrote more about this in Tanyi (2012). One 
point deserves short notice, though. Some philosophers argue that in addition to 
costs one should also consider the factor Scheﬄ  er (1992: 98) calls conﬁ nement. In 
his formulation a moral theory is conﬁ ning to the extent the constraints it involves 
narrow the range of morally acceptable courses of action open to the agent. It is, 
however, questionable whether conﬁ nement indeed constitutes an independent 
factor. Murphy (2000: 29–30), for instance, argues that a large part of conﬁ nement 
can be explained as losses that the agent suﬀ ers in her well-being when obey-
ing with moral dictates, and this is just the traditional understanding of a moral 
demand.
6 Unfortunately, it is easy to cite statistics for this claim. Any report by the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and 
so on paints the same dire picture, certainly of the global situation, but also, in 
most cases, of domestic circumstances. See Miklós (2013: 2–3) for more data and 
references.
7 See also Williams (1973b) and Stocker (1976) for a very similar objection. It is clear 
that the integrity objection is closely allied to Williams’ thinking about internal rea-
sons in Williams (1981a). See Hurley (2009: Chapter 4) who works out this connec-
tion in detail.
8 What happens if the agent has no lower-order projects? In this case, no alienation 
and integrity charge follows. However, this is certainly an extreme case, the truest 
form of what Wolf (1982) calls a moral saint, and comes with other problems, as 
Wolf demonstrates. Moreover, it is also clear that not everyone can be (even if, con-
tra Wolf, should be) a moral saint. Being a higher-order project, utilitarianism needs 
lower-order projects, that is, it needs people who have those projects and are thus 
not saints themselves.
9 Hence Williams’ (1981b) charge that utilitarianism requires the agent to have “one 
thought too many” when doing the morally right thing. Jim’s motivating thought 
in helping the Indians wouldn’t merely be, as it should be, that they are in trouble 
and need help, but also that this action is permitt ed (or required) by morality. See 
also Smith’s (1995) related fetishism charge for further discussion.
10 There are some loose ends here, though. In particular, it is a question how impor-
tant the utilitarian project must be as compared to the other, lower- and higher-
order projects of the agent. Hurley (2009: Chapter 4) argues that it must be the 
agent’s most important, ultimate project that subsumes all other lower-order 
projects. Now, the integrity objection is about how utilitarianism forces the agent 
to look at his or her central commitments in life and as such, it seems to hold 
even if the utilitarian higher-order project is not a project of ultimate importance. 
However, if it is not such an ultimate project, it means that on certain occasions at 
least, the agent can experience his or her lower-order projects in the proper (i.e. 
non-alienating) way and this certainly tones down (if not eliminates) the force of 
Williams’ objection.
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11 For the relevant consequentialist responses on doing versus allowing, see Howard-
Snyder (2011); on the separateness of persons, see Parﬁ t (1984), Brink (1997); on 
issues of integrity, see Railton (1984) and Scheﬄ  er (1992).
12 To give an example, in Jim and the Indians, there is the cost that Jim is required to 
bear if he decides to shoot the one chosen Indian: namely, that he becomes a killer. 
At the same time, there is also the cost that will befall upon all the Indians who will 
be shot by Pedro if Jim decides not to shoot the one chosen Indian and thereby pre-
vent Pedro from killing every Indian.
13 The ﬁ rst option in the disjunctive statement keeps the demandingness objection, 
but extends it to other theories. However, the second option is in eﬀ ect a response 
to the objection, oft en called the “companions in guilt” strategy. See Ashford (2003) 
for employing this line of reasoning on the ground that Scanlon’s contractualism 
is also excessively demanding. See Mulgan (2007) and Bykvist (2010) for a general 
discussion of this strategy.
14 Unless it can be proven that no such intuition really exists or for some reason it is 
not to be relied upon. Such result could follow if, as Parﬁ t (2011) claims, all the main 
moral theories (when properly understood) converge. But of course this is a big “if” 
and many do not seem to agree with Parﬁ t’s conclusion in his monumental work.
15 See Bykvist (2010: 105) and Portmore (2011: 134) for two att empts to resolve the 
paradox but not in the “proper” way, that is, without putt ing an end to the demand-
ingness problem.
16 I understand “decisive reason” and “most reason” to mean the same. There are some 
complications here, which I am disregarding in this chapter. In particular, the two 
notions come apart if reasons can behave “unusually,” for example, if they can silence 
or bracket each other. For more on this kind of behavior of reasons, see Tanyi (2013).
17 The labels I use for these response strategies come from Mulgan (2001).
18 For a thorough discussion and criticism of the ﬁ rst, empirical strategy, see Mulgan 
(2001) and Bykvist (2010). The second approach, the restructuring strategy has given 
rise to such positions as sub-maximizing consequentialism (Slote 1984; for criticism, 
see Pett it 1984 and Bradley 2006), two-level consequentialism (Hare 1981; and in gen-
eral the distinction between decision procedure and criterion of rightness in Railton 
1984; for criticism, see McNaughton 1988), rule-consequentialism (most recently 
Hooker 2000; for criticism, see Mulgan 2001), limited consequentialism (Scheﬄ  er 
1992, 1994; for criticism, see Kagan 1984), cooperative consequentialism (Murphy 
2000; for criticism, see Mulgan 2001), and combined consequentialism (Mulgan 
2001).
19 This is anyway what they should claim. Oft en, however, as Portmore (2011: 26) 
points out, the extremist claim seems to be that consequentialism is indeed too 
demanding in this sense, but this is not objectionable. In other words, the strategy 
would then accept premise (2), but deny premise (4). But this is certainly no way to 
proceed since consequentialists simply cannot grant to their opponents the truth of 
the claim that their theory makes demands that are not morally right. This would 
obviously be self-defeating for the theory.
20 See Kagan (1989); Singer (1972); Tännsjö (2002); Unger (1996); Sobel (2007); for 
critical discussion of this approach, see Cullity (1994) and Mulgan (2001, 2007). 
The intuition extremists focus on can be just those particular intuitions that cer-
tain counterexamples are meant to evoke against their theory (such as, e.g., in Your 
Money and Charity); or they can focus on moral intuitions in general. The latt er way 
of arguing gave rise to a separate debate about the use of intuitions in moral theory. 
See Singer (2005) versus Sandberg and Juth (2011).
21 In this section, unless otherwise stated, all page references in brackets will be to this 
book.
9781441126283_Ch29_Final_txt_print.indd   522 4/16/2015   10:42:57 AM
Moral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of Consequentialism
523
22 That is, as Peterson elsewhere explains, “something counts as an aspect if and only 
the deontic status of an act varies if we hold constant everything but the putative 
aspect in question” (15).
23 The clause “can be characterized” in the deﬁ nition of one-dimensional conse-
quentialism is important because it makes the set of one-dimensional theories less 
restricted. For all it requires is that we ﬁ nd a moral aspect that makes it possible to 
characterize an act’s deontic status as a function of that one aspect; this does not rule 
out that another characterization exists that employs several moral aspects.
24 He brings geometry as an analogous case: “The area of the circle depends on only 
one aspect (its radius) whereas the area of the triangle depends on two aspects (its 
base and height). All three aspects are elements of the same dimension (length). 
This is not always the case, however, as can be seen by considering an analogy with 
physics: mass and time are diﬀ erent aspects, but they are also elements of diﬀ erent 
dimensions” (4).
25 Peterson deﬁ nes incomparability as the claim that “for some consequences, no pair-
wise evaluative comparisons can be made.” As for the other notion, his deﬁ nition 
is that “two elements are on a par if and only if they are comparable, although it is 
false that one is at least as good as the other” (9).
26 I do this in an unpublished paper coauthored with Vuko Andric. We focus on the 
relation between C1 and C3 and the argument for C3.
27 Or least wrong: Since we are dealing with all-things-considered rightness and 
wrongness, the act that is most right is also the least wrong (the two degrees must 
add up to 1).
28 Another problem is that it is not clear that what Peterson is talking about in discuss-
ing the case is indeed degrees of rightness/wrongness and not what he calls moral 
strength (see his Chapter 2.4 on this distinction). Roughly, how much we donate 
appears to be about how much moral value we produce or fail to produce and this 
is strength, not degree (that is given by the important moral value of helping/saving 
lives, which is the same in all instances), according to Peterson (cf. 2013: 93, 117).
29 Satisﬁ cing consequentialism is the view that the right thing to do is what is good 
enough, for example, produces enough utility. See Slote (1984) for the original for-
mulation and Bradley (2006) for criticism. Suﬃ  cientarianism is a view about how to 
distribute goods fairly and holds that the right distribution is the one in which no 
individual is allowed to fall below a certain threshold. See Crisp (2003) for a recent 
statement and Temkin (2003) for criticism.
30 Agent-relative values are values that make essential reference to the agent who has 
the value: the value of special relationships (family, love), for instance, is agent-rela-
tive since it is essential to mention whose relations we are talking about in order to 
understand the goodness of these relationships. On the agent-relative versus agent-
neutral distinction in more detail, see Ridge (2011). Consequentialism traditionally 
operates with agent-neutral values only: it does not matt er, for example, whose 
pleasure or pain we are talking about—the badness of these states can be under-
stood without reference to the agent who has them. However, some consequential-
ists recently att empted to broaden consequentialism to accommodate agent-relative 
values as well. On an insightful critique of what is oft en called evaluator-relative 
consequentialism, see Schroeder (2007). A person-relative dimension of value, I take 
it, could be Peterson’s versions of this idea: it would incorporate agent-relativity 
into the dimension of person (and thus well-being).
31 For a good discussion of the ideal versus non-ideal theory distinction, see Simmons 
(2010).
32 Although there are other objections to dualism in the literature (I have in mind 
Cohen 1992, 1997, 2000 and Nagel 1991), these are discussed and responded to by 
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others (such as Scheﬄ  er 2005, 2006). The chapter by Andres Moles in this volume 
also has a good discussion of several of the issues these authors raise.
33 Again, a good discussion of the upcoming issues can be found in the chapter by 
Andres Moles in this volume.
34 Some, like Nagel (2005), seem to hold that a non-relational theory must be monist, 
but I fail to see the connection. The relational/non-relational distinction concerns 
the grounds of justice (with consequences for its scope), whereas the monism/dual-
ism distinction is about the site of justice. Although both invoke institutions, they do 
so in an entirely diﬀ erent role.
35 For an early representative see Pogge (1994); for a more recent contributions, see 
Moellendorf (2011).
36 See, for example, Nussbaum (2007) for a long list of the relevant institutions and 
schemes.
37 Hurley (2009: Chapter 2) presents this problem as a “troubling normative triad” for 
consequentialism. The elements of the triad are the consequentialist moral standard 
(CMS), the existence of non-impersonal reasons (NIR), and the rational authority of 
moral standards (RAMS). The point is the same as in my presentation: the elements 
of the triad cannot be ﬁ tt ed together into one coherent, defensible whole.
38 There are also those responses that reject the argument by questioning what it 
assumes. Scalar-consequentialists claim that consequentialism makes no demands 
on us, although it does give us reasons to act. See Norcross (2006); for a response, 
see McElwee (2011). What we might call normative relativism argues that every 
reason is relative to a point of view, hence there is common platform on which they 
can compete with each other. See Kagan (1989) and Copp (1997); for a criticism, see 
McLeod (2001).
39 Evaluator-relative consequentialism, mentioned in footnote 29, is one att empt, 
Cummiskey (1996)’s Kantian consequentialism is another. For a critical discussion 
of the latt er see Hurley (2009: Chapter 6.2). But we should note that these theories 
only deal with a subset of all the “missing” reasons and hence cannot be taken as 
providing a complete response, even if they do not fail otherwise.
40 With Martin Bruder, I have been carrying out research along these lines with prom-
ising results that show that the majority of people regard consequentialist reasons 
as overriding other considerations See, for example, Bruder and Tanyi (2014).
41 Sobel (2007: 14–15) appears to be in agreement with this. Portmore (2011) disagrees 
but, as we shall see, he doesn’t share this picture of morality and rationality. He also 
provides an intricate argument for moral rationalism that he defends in detail. I say 
more about his argument for moral rationalism in Tanyi (2012), but no doubt, more 
critical discussion would be needed.
42 Hurley (1999: 122), for instance, endorses Portmore’s general picture about reasons 
and morality—he calls it the moral authority of rational standards (MARS)—but 
thinks that it leads nowhere near to consequentialism.
43 In particular, Portmore (2011: Chapter 3) argues for a teleological conception of 
reasons that he claims to be embedded in consequentialism.
44 For some initial att empts, see Hurley (2014), Archer (2014), and Gert (2014).
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